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T
he Federal Reserve initially responded to the finan-
cial crisis by reducing its target for the federal funds
rate by 325 basis points from September 17, 2007,
to April 30, 2008. On August 17, 2007, the Fed also reduced
its primary credit rate from 100 basis points above the funds
rate target to 50 basis points above the target and increased
the maximum term for primary credit borrowing to 30 days.
The primary credit rate was reduced to 25 basis points above
the target on March 17, 2008. The Fed also introduced
several new lending facilities: The Term Auction Facility
(TAF) and temporary currency swaps with the European
Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank on December 12,
2007, and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility on March 16,
2008.1
Loans to depository institutions and central banks
increased by nearly $250 billion from late December 2007
to the week ending September 10, 2008. The Fed sold a com-
parable quantity of Treasury securities to offset (“sterilize”)
the effect of this lending on the monetary base and, hence,
the total supply of credit. Sterilized lending causes the
unchanged total supply of credit to be reallocated to the
borrowing institutions.2 The Fed sterilized its lending for
two reasons. First, it believed that market imperfections
prevented some institutions, primarily banks and other
depository institutions, from obtaining credit. It believed
that the reallocation of credit to these institutions would
mitigate the effect of the financial crisis on bank lending.
Second, the Fed was implementing monetary policy by
setting a target for the effective federal funds rate. The Fed
was concerned that such a large increase in the supply of
credit would cause the funds rate to fall below the Federal
Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) target.
The effectiveness of these actions is questionable for at
least three reasons. First, despite the 325-basis-point reduc-
tion in the funds rate target, longer-term rates, which are
widely regarded as important for consumer and business
spending decisions, declined much less. Indeed, some
important lending rates remain essentially unchanged.
Second, economic and finance theory suggests that reallo-
cating credit will have no positive macroeconomic effects
unless financial markets allocate credit inefficiently; and a
large body of empirical evidence suggests that financial
markets are highly efficient. Thus, the Fed’s reallocation of
credit might have had, at most, a minimal positive effect.
Indeed, the effect could be negative if the credit allocation
caused by the Fed’s activity was less efficient than the pre-
vious market allocation. Third, many analysts argued that
the financial crisis was caused by a shortage of liquidity—
markets were “frozen up.” Sterilized lending cannot deal
with this problem because it does not increase the total
quantity of credit available to the market.
It is perhaps not surprising then that economic activity
and financial market conditions deteriorated in spite of the
cumulative 325-basis-point cut in the funds rate target and
the Fed’s nearly $250 billion reallocation of credit. The unem-
ployment rate increased from 4.9 percent in December 2007
to 6.2 percent in August 2008, and real output declined at
a 0.72 percent rate in the first quarter of 2008 and increased
at an anemic 1.46 percent rate in the second quarter. More  -
over, in August 2008 most forecasters were anticipating
anemic growth in the last half of the year. Financial market
conditions also continued to deteriorate. Bear Stearns was
bailed out by JP Morgan with the assistance of the Fed on
March 14, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in
government receivership on September 7, Lehman Brothers
declared bankruptcy on September 15, and American
International Group (AIG) failed on September 16.
The failures of Lehman Brothers and AIG resulted in a
monumental increase in the Fed’s existing lending programs.
For example, TAF and primary credit lending increased
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2008, to about $510 billion for the week ending November 12,
2008. Moreover, the Fed introduced a series of new lending
programs. Unable to sterilize such massive lending, the
monetary base increased from about $850 billion for the
week ending September 10, 2008, to about $1.75 trillion for
the week ending January 7, 2009.3 The monetary base has
remained at about this level since then.
Since this so-called quantitative easing the economy has
shown marked signs of improving. Indeed, several analysts
have suggested that the recession ended in June 2009.
Moreover, a variety of indicators suggest that the financial
crisis has abated. Indeed, banks have begun repaying loans
from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which
was approved on October 2, 2008.
The apparent failure of the Fed’s 325-basis-point cut in
its fund rate target and its credit reallocation program and
the apparent success of the Fed’s quantitative easing raises
an interesting question: Would financial markets and the
economy have been better off if the Fed pursued a policy
of quantitative easing sooner? Unfortunately, we cannot
conduct a controlled experiment, so we can never be sure
of the answer. Nevertheless, the financial crisis was charac-
terized by a shortage of credit, which suggests that had the
Fed initially pursued a policy of increasing the total supply
of credit (the monetary base), financial markets partici-
pants would have been better able to adjust to the decline in
house prices. The more than doubling of the monetary
base was a consequence of the increased need for credit in
the wake of the failures of Lehman Brothers and AIG, which
the Fed was unable to sterilize. Nevertheless, the Fed could
have achieved the same result by actively purchasing a
variety of financial assets, as it is currently doing. Who
knows: Had the Fed significantly increased the supply of
credit sooner, the failures of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
and AIG may have been avoided and, so too, the need for
the TARP.
A possible lesson from these events is that financial
markets and the economy might be better off if, in future
financial crises, the Fed first increases the supply of credit
available to the market. Additional actions can be taken if
there is evidence that quantitative easing alone is insufficient.
Of course, this means that the Fed must be willing to
promptly, albeit temporarily, abandon its funds rate target.
The inflationary consequences of quantitative easing can
be mitigated by informing the market that the increased
monetary base will be reduced systematically at the first
signs that the economy is improving and the financial
market crisis is abating. ￿
1 For a complete and up-to-date financial market crisis timeline, go to
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CrisisTimeline.pdf. 
2 For details, see Thornton, Daniel L. “The Fed, Liquidity, and Credit Allocation.”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2009, 91(1), pp. 13-21;
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/09/01/Thornton.pdf.
3 Not surprisingly, given this large increase in the supply of credit, the effective
federal funds rate declined precipitously. The FOMC reduced its funds rate target
to between zero and 25 basis points on December 16, 2008.
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